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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0") and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and its Order dated February 9, 2004. [Order, R. 840.] 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
A. Did the district court correctly construe the 19 51 Indenture as conveying 
an easement for the uses specified in the Indenture rather than fee title to the surface of the 
subject property? 
The district court's construction of the Indenture is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ffl[15, 37, 44 P.3d 781 
(reviewing grant of summary judgment regarding boundary dispute and construction of deed 
for correctness); Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653,656 (Utah 1979) (reviewing construction 
of deed for correctness). 
B. Did Missouri Flat fail to preserve its claims of adverse possession, 
laches, and estoppel for appellate review where these claims were abandoned at oral 
argument, not addressed in the district court's Decision, and not raised by Missouri Flat in 
response to the proposed Order? 
The determination that a party failed to preserve an issue for appellate review 
is a decision made for the first time by the appellate court and therefore not subject to any 
particular standard of review. Notwithstanding, the appellate court should defer in some 
measure to the trial court in determining from the record whether an issue was raised before 
the trial court in a timely fashion or raised to a sufficient level of consciousness. See, e.g., 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (explaining need to defer to trial court and 
review for clear error in circumstances where the trial court is "in the [better] position to . 
. . derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to 
garner from a cold record"). 
C. If the issue of adverse possession was adequately preserved, can 
Missouri Flat establish title to the surface by adverse possession and demonstrate hostile and 
adverse possession if the Indenture conveyed an easement for Missouri Flat to use the land? 
Because a determination of ownership by adverse possession requires both 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, this issue presents a mixed question. See, e.g., 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-38 (Utah 1994) (discussing mixed questions); Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-12-7 to -12.1 (2004) (outlining elements of adverse possession). In general, the 
district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, and the findings of fact are 
reversed only if they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Drazich v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324, 326 
2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (noting legal issues are reviewed for correctness and factual issues for 
clear error in case involving interpretation of indenture and claims of adverse possession). 
However, when confronted with a mixed question of fact and law, appellate courts afford 
some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of law to the facts. See Pena, 869 
P.2d at 937-38. 
D. If the issues of laches and estoppel were adequately preserved, can 
Missouri Flat demonstrate laches or estoppel? 
The equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel also present mixed questions. 
See, e.g.,Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) 
("[W]hether equitable estoppel has been proven is a classic mixed question of fact and law"); 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, (Utahl983) (noting "considerable 
deference" given to trial court on mixed question of laches). When confronted with a mixed 
question, appellate courts afford some measure of discretion to the trial court's application 
of law to the facts. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, OR RULES. 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal. 
3 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE. 
A. Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings. 
Gold Mountain filed this case to quiet title to the subject property (the 
"Property") located mostly in Piute County, Utah. The action included a number of parties 
and title issues. [Complaint, R. 1-65.] Summary judgment was granted or the action was 
dismissed as to all parties except Missouri Flat. [Notice of Dismissal, R. 308-09, Order 
Granting Summary Judgment, R. 412-20.] Gold Mountain asserted Missouri Flat's interest 
in the Property was limited to an easement for the purposes described in the 1951 Indenture 
(the "Indenture") from Gold Mountain's predecessor in interest to Missouri Flat's 
predecessor in interest. [Complaint, R. 1-65.] {See Addendum, Exhibit 1.) 
Gold Mountain filed a motion for summary judgment on its claims regarding 
Missouri Flat's interest in the Property with supporting affidavits and a memorandum. 
[Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 333-35, Memorandum in Support, R. 322-32, 
Affidavit of Russell Reiserer, R. 336-39, Supplemental Affidavit of Russell Reiserer, R. 340-
42.] Missouri Flat filed a Memorandum in response to the original motion for summary 
judgment [R. 343-64] and a Rule 56(f) motion to continue discovery. [Motion to Continue 
Discovery, R. 397-98.] A hearing was held on those motions and the district court granted 
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the Rule 56(f) Motion but did not rule on the motion for summary judgment. [Order 
Granting Rule 56(f) Motion, R. 442-44.] 
After the additional discovery, Missouri Flat amended its Answer and 
Counterclaim to allege adverse possession, laches, and estoppel. [First Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim, R. 447-57.] Supplemental memoranda were filed by both parties on the 
original motion for summary judgment. [Supplementary Memorandum, R. 472-86 and Reply 
to Supplementary Memorandum, R. 645-58.] Gold Mountain subsequently filed a separate 
motion for summary judgment on Missouri Flat's claims of adverse possession, laches and 
estoppel with supporting memorandum and affidavit. [Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (Adverse Possession, Laches and Estoppel), R. 638-40, Memorandum in Support 
of Second MSJ, R. 603-37, Affidavit of Russell Reiserer, R. 641-44.] A Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Second Motion was filed by Missouri Flat [R. 659-77] and a Reply 
Memorandum was filed by Gold Mountain. [R. 778-89.] 
A review hearing was held on the motions for summary judgment in the district 
court in February 2003. [Notice of Review Hearing, R. 796-97.] A telephonic hearing was 
held on April 16,2003. [Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, R. 843, T. 1-27.] During the 
telephonic hearing the district court asked for an explanation of the issues to be addressed. 
[T. 20-24.] The arguments of both parties focused on the Indenture and the parties agreed 
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that the court should construe the Indenture solely from the language within the four corners 
of the Indenture, that they were not claiming that the Indenture was ambiguous, and that 
extrinsic evidence should not be used to determine the intent of the parties. [T. 4-21.] 
Missouri Flat did not state that any other issues remained to be resolved including adverse 
possession, laches and estoppel, even though the court asked if anything else needed to be 
discussed. [T. 20-24.] 
The Court issued a Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment. [Decision 
on Motions for Summary Judgment (the "Decision"), R. 804-08.] {See Addendum, 
Exhibit 2.) In its Decision the district court ruled that Missouri Flat owned a permanent 
easement on the surface of the Property for grazing and agricultural purposes subject to Gold 
Mountain's right to use the surface and sub-surface for mining purposes and that Missouri 
Flat owned the frame house and the surface which it covers in fee simple. The court ruled 
that Gold Mountain owned all other rights in the Property. The Decision did not address the 
issues of adverse possession, laches, or estoppel. [R. 804-08.] 
Counsel for Gold Mountain prepared the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order and Decree (the "Order") as directed by the Court in the Decision. Because 
Missouri Flat had not pursued the issues of adverse possession, laches or estoppel, the Order 
provided that Missouri Flat had not established those claims. [Order, fflf 3 ,11 , R. 820-22.] 
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The Order was submitted to Missouri Flat's attorney for review, who requested some 
revisions but did not object to the proposed disposition of adverse possession, laches, and 
estoppel. The Order was entered by the district court. [Order, R. 818-30.] (See Addendum, 
Exhibit 3.) 
B. Factual Background. 
Before the Indenture, Gold Mountain's predecessor-in-interest owned all right, 
title, and interests in the Property that historically had been used for gold mining operations. 
[Order, R. 819-20; Reply Memorandum, R. 779-83.] Since the Indenture, Missouri Flat and 
its predecessors-in-interest have only used the Property for grazing sheep and/or cattle and 
uses directly related to those purposes. [Order, R. 819-20; Reply Memorandum, R. 781.] 
Missouri Flat's predecessors used their interest in the Property, along with other land and 
interests associated with a large ranching operation, as security for various loans. [Order, R. 
819-20; Reply Memorandum, R. 781.] Missouri Flat acquired its interest in the Property by 
a July 19,1994 Trustee's Deed resulting from foreclosure by First Security Bank of Utah of 
a 1987 Trust Deed from prior owners. [Trustee's Deed, R. 672-704.] Missouri Flat also 
obtained a Quitclaim Deed from First Security Bank dated July 20,1994. [Quitclaim Deed, 
R. 705-738.] 
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Missouri Flat and its predecessors claim to have paid some taxes on the surface 
of the Property. [Aplt's Br. p. 3.] Since 1976, however, Gold Mountain and its predecessors 
have paid property taxes that were assessed upon the Property as mineral properties. 
[Reiserer Aff.^ f 8, R. 641-44.] Missouri Flat and its predecessors have not taken any action 
or given any indication to Gold Mountain or its predecessors that they claimed any interest 
in the Property other than the grazing and agricultural rights granted by the Indenture. 
[Reiserer Aff., fflf 5-6; R. 641-44.] 
Gold Mountain and its predecessors and their agents have conducted mineral 
exploration and development activities on the Property, have built and maintained several 
buildings and other improvements on the Property, and have occupied and used the Property 
for mining, camping, and recreational activities. [Reiserer Aff. fflf 2-4; R. 641-44.] 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
A. The Indenture Conveyed an Easement for the Specified Purposes. 
The Indenture grants and conveys the surface of the Property for grazing and 
agricultural purposes. Utah case law and other authorities hold that such a conveyance for 
specified uses grants an easement for those uses. Construing the Indenture as granting an 
easement is necessary to give meaning and purpose to all of the language of the Indenture. 
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The Utah case law supporting Gold Mountain's interpretation of the Indenture is controlling 
and case law cited by Missouri Flat does not support its interpretation of the Indenture. 
B. The Case Law Appellant Cites from Other States Conflicts with 
Utah Case Law. 
The Court should rely on Utah case law instead of the conflicting case law 
from other states espoused by Missouri Flat. The contrary case law from other states does 
not clearly represent the majority rule. 
C. The Rules of Construction Relied Upon by Missouri Flat do not Support its 
Interpretation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3 and the cases based thereon do not support Missouri 
Flat's interpretation of the Indenture. Rules of construction based on ambiguity are inappropriate 
in light of representations made by Missouri Flat to the district court that the Indenture is 
unambiguous. 
D. Missouri Flat Failed to Preserve Claims of Adverse Possession. Laches, 
and Estoppel for Appellate Review. 
Missouri Flat failed to give the court an opportunity to rule on the issues of 
laches, estoppel, and adverse possession because it did not sufficiently raise those issues to 
the consciousness of the court and because Missouri Flat did not object to the disposition of 
those claims in the final order. 
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E. Missouri Flat Cannot Prevail on its Claim of Adverse Possession. 
Assuming the issue was adequately preserved, Missouri Flat cannot prevail on 
its claim that it has established title to the remaining interests in the surface by adverse 
possession. No possession has been asserted beyond the use of the surface for grazing and 
agricultural purposes, as the Indenture granted, and Missouri Flat and its predecessors have 
done nothing to give notice that they claimed an interest adverse to Gold Mountain and its 
predecessors. 
F. Missouri Flat Cannot Prevail on its Claims of Laches and Estoppel. 
Assuming the issues were adequately preserved, Missouri Flat cannot prevail 
on its claims of laches and estoppel because there has been no lack of diligence in bringing 
this action, no action or lack thereof that Missouri could have reasonably relied on to its 
detriment, and the claim of prejudice cannot be supported. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. UNDER UTAH LAW THE INDENTURE CONVEYED AN EASEMENT 
FOR THE USES SPECIFIED. 
This case involves the construction of the Indenture from Annie Laurie 
Consolidated Gold Mines ("First Party") to Franklin Taft Paxton, Claine Tad Paxton, 
Genevieve P. Rawson and Geraldine Paxton ("Second Parties") dated April 26, 1951 and 
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recorded July 20, 1951 at Book J of Mining, Page 615 of the Records of Piute County 
Recorder's Office (the "Indenture"). (Order, f 5, R. 818-30; Addendum, Ex. 1.) Gold 
Mountain is the successor-in-interest to the rights retained in the Indenture by First Party and 
Missouri Flat is the successor-in-interest to the interests conveyed to Second Parties by the 
Indenture. (Addendum, Ex. 3.) 
Gold Mountain agrees with the rules of construction to be applied by the Utah 
courts as set out in the Appellant's Brief. Those rules of construction provide that deeds are 
construed according to the ordinary rules of contract construction; that the paramount rule 
of construction is to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the deed as whole 
and from the language of the deed; and that in interpreting the language of a deed no portion 
should be rendered meaningless. (Aplt's Br., pp. 5-6.) The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that "the main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, 
especially that of the grantor, from the language used" in the deed and the term intention "is 
a term of art and signifies the meaning of the writing" Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653,656 
(Utah 1979) (italics in original). The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that if the intent 
of the parties can be ascertained, "arbitrary rules of law are not to be invoked, and will not 
control the construction of the instrument." Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1939) 
(quoting Kirwin v. Farr, 17 Utah 1, 53 P. 608, 609 (1898)). 
11 
While the parties agree upon the rules of construction, they do not agree upon 
the interpretation of the Indenture. Missouri Flat contends the Indenture conveyed to Second 
Parties full fee title to the surface of the Property. Gold Mountain asserts that because the 
Indenture conveyed the surface for grazing and agricultural purposes and granted a separate 
right to cut and remove certain species of trees from the surface, the Indenture granted an 
easement to Second Parties for the stated uses under Utah law. 
The Indenture states in relevant part, as follows: 
That First Party, expressly subject to the exceptions and reservations in 
favor of First Party its successors and assigns hereinafter mentioned 
and set forth and, for and in consideration of the sum of One Thousand 
Dollars ($ 1,000.00) and other good and valuable consideration paid by 
Second Parties, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, hereby 
grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto Second Parties for grazing 
and agricultural purposes, the surface of the following described 
Patented Lode Mining Claims in Gold Mountain Mining District, 
and the surface only of the Other Property described below, with 
the right to cut and remove from the surface of said Patented Lode 
Mining Claims and Other Property any or all of the quaking aspen 
and chaparral thereon, all of said mining claims and property being 
situated in Piute and Sevier Counties, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Patented Lode Mining Claims: 
[descriptions omitted] 
Together with the one story frame house located in Upper 
Kimberly at the fork of the road leading to Sevier and Marysvale, 
Utah. 
Other Property: 
[descriptions omitted] 
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And for the consideration aforesaid First Party hereby conveys and 
quit claims unto Second Parties, for grazing and agricultural 
purposes, the surface of the following described patented lode 
mining Claims in Gold Mountain Mining District situate in Piute 
County, Utah: 
[descriptions omitted] 
EXPRESSLY EXCEPTING AND RESERVING HOWEVER, unto the 
said First Party its successors and assigns, all mines and minerals of 
whatsoever kind or nature situate, lying or being on, in or under all or 
any of the patented lode mining claims and other property above 
described, together with the right and privileges at all times for First 
Party its successors and assigns and its and their agents and workmen 
to enter into and upon any of said patented lode mining claims and 
other property hereinabove described or any part thereof, and to search 
for, work, mine, develop, remove, extract, store, treat, mill and carry 
away all said mines and minerals of whatever kind or nature the same 
may be, and to sink pits and shafts, and to make and drive tunnels, 
drifts, winzes and other underground workings of every kind, and to 
occupy and use such parts of the surface hereby conveyed for the 
construction of such roads and the erection and construction of such 
buildings, mills, reduction works and other structures, pipe, power and 
transmission lines, dumps, tailings ponds, and other facilities as maybe 
necessary in connection with any of said mining, milling, or other 
operations, as fully and entirely as if said First Party its successors and 
assigns remained the owner in fee simple of said surface, without any 
liability whatever on the part of First Party its successors and assigns 
to Second Parties and their respective heirs, executors, administrator 
and assigns, for any loss, damage or injury that may occur to any 
property of Second Parties and their respective heirs, executives, 
administrators and assigns, or to said surface by reason of searching 
for, working, developing, mining, extracting, storing, treating, milling, 
removing and carrying away all of said mines and minerals of every 
kind or nature, and/or utilizing said surface as aforesaid in connection 
therewith, provided, however, First Party its successors and assigns 
shall conduct all of said searching, developing, working, mining, 
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storing, treating, milling, removing and transporting operations and all 
acts and things connected therewith or incidental thereto in such 
manner as will cause as little inconvenience to or interruption of the 
use of said Surface by Second Parties and their respective heirs, 
executors, administrators and assigns as is consistent with the proper 
conduct and carrying on of any of said mining, milling, or other 
operations. 
Second Parties are hereby given the right to use, for stock watering 
purposes, such water rights as First Party may have that are available 
and applicable for such purposes. . . and provided further that said right 
of Second Parties to so use said water rights shall not in any manner or 
to any extent interfere with or prevent the use thereof for mining or 
milling operations by First Party it[s] successors and assigns on any 
part of the property of First Part[y]. 
This conveyance is made expressly subject: 
[additional exceptions omitted] 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described surface and building 
hereby conveyed unto Second Parties, their heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns forever, subject to the aforesaid exceptions, 
reservations and restrictions. 
[remainder of Indenture omitted] 
(Addendum, Ex. 1 (emphasis added).) 
The district court ruled that the Indenture is not ambiguous. [Addendum, Ex. 3, 
Tf 4, R. 818-30.] The plain language of the Indenture indicates First Party intended to convey 
something less than full rights to the surface of the Property because of the limiting phrase 
"for grazing and agricultural purposes" right after the transfer verb "sells." [Id. at % 5.] The 
court ruled that the word "for" was intended to show the purposes for which the surface 
could be used and that it excludes other purposes. [Id. at f^ 6.] The district court also found 
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that the separate conveyance of the one story house was not so limited. [Id. at Tj 9.] Based 
on its analysis of the language of the Indenture, the district court ruled that Missouri Flat 
owns an easement for grazing and agricultural purposes and to cut and removed aspen and 
chaparral trees on the Property, and that Missouri Flat owns the house and the land on which 
it is located in fee simple. [Id. at f^ 10.] The court ruled that Gold Mountain owned all other 
rights to the surface of the subject property. [Id. at f 12.] 
1. Utah case law holds that a conveyance of property for specified uses creates 
an easement. 
The district court's ruling is in full accord with the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861 (Utah 1939), where the Court construed a deed that 
conveyed all ground covered by two lakes with associated rights. The deed provided that 
"Said lakes are to be used for the propagation of fish and the removal of the same by the 
grantees or assigns." Id. at 862. In determining the nature and extent of the interest granted 
by that deed, the Court stated: 
The language in the deed to Hunt, "hereby convey and warrant" 
normally implies a grant of the fee, but as shown supra the qualifying 
clause, "to be used for the propagation offish and the removal of the 
same" unless properly descriptive of the premises, is such language as 
would naturally be used to qualify or limit the grant, to change it from 
a fee to an easement. The description of the property for grant of fee 
is complete without this clause, and unless the clause is used to limit or 
qualify the grant it can serve no purpose whatsoever. It is an elemental 
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rule of construction that in construing such instruments every word 
must be given effect if possible and reasonable, upon the theory that the 
grantor used no words except those necessary or convenient to express 
the intent of the parties. 
Id. at 864 (emphasis added). 
Similarly in this action, the Indenture's reference to the surface and the legal 
descriptions were sufficient for a complete grant of fee title to the surface. Therefore, the 
qualifying clause "for grazing and agricultural purposes" would serve no purpose except to 
limit or qualify the grant and change the estate granted from a fee to an easement. 
Missouri Flat dismisses the limiting language in the Indenture as simply 
describing "the use that was anticipated by the parties at the time of the conveyance of the 
surface" but offers no basis for that assertion. The location of that limiting language between 
"grants, bargains sells and conveys to Second Parties" and "the surface of the following 
described" indicates it was intended to qualify or limit the grant of the surface. Including the 
same limiting language again in the subsequent paragraph where First Party separately 
conveyed and quitclaimed to Second Parties "for grazing and agricultural purposes" the 
surface of separately described property indicates a careful intent to limit both conveyances 
of the surface, and not simply to indicate the anticipated uses. 
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Indeed, Missouri Flat's argument would render the language superfluous. If 
First Party truly intended to convey fee title it would have no reason to describe the 
anticipated use, because Second Parties could use it for whatever they wanted. The language 
at issue has meaning only if it limits the estate conveyed. The district court noted that the 
word "for" is "used as a function word to indicate purpose" and indicates that the phrase was 
intended to limit the grant to those purposes, not just to indicate anticipated uses. 
[Addendum, Ex. 2., R. 806.] 
If the "for grazing and agricultural purposes" limitation is dismissed so that the 
Indenture conveys fee title to the surface instead of an easement, other language in the 
Indenture is also rendered meaningless. The grant "with the right to cut and remove from 
the surface of said Patented Lode Mining Claims and Other Property any or all of the quaking 
aspen and chaparral thereon" would be meaningless if the Indentured conveyed fee title to 
the surface. A fee owner has the right to use all trees and other resources growing on the 
surface however he wants. This language is difficult to dismiss as merely a statement of 
other intended uses since the grant is limited to two specific species of trees. 
The provision "Together with the one story frame house located in Upper 
Kimberly at the fork of the road leading to Sevier and Marysvale, Utah" is also unnecessary 
if the Indenture conveyed fee title to the surface. A fee simple conveyance of land on which 
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a building is located would normally include the building, so there is no need to separately 
convey the house unless the Indenture conveyed only an easement. The separate conveyance 
of the house without limiting language is the reason the district court concluded that the 
Indenture conveyed fee title to the house and the land on which it was located. Missouri 
Flat's contentions that the district court was troubled by this portion of the deed and that the 
finding that the house was granted in fee simple required a "tortured analysis" are not 
warranted. 
2. Reservation of the Right to Use the Surface for Mining Purposes is Consistent 
With the Grant of an Easement. 
Missouri Flat contends the reservation of mineral rights and the right to use the 
surface for mining operations is totally inconsistent with the grant of an easement, as opposed 
to conveying fee title to the surface. However, the reservations are fully consistent with a 
grant of an easement. The reservations were not necessary to retain title to the mineral rights 
since a conveyance of the surface would not convey the mineral rights but they were 
necessary to avoid interfering with the dominant estate of the easement owner. 
The mineral owner has the right to use the surface for mineral extraction 
whether an easement was granted or the surface was conveyed in fee. Utah law provides that 
the owner of a severed mineral estate has a right to use the surface to mine and remove the 
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minerals, and the right of the mineral owner to use the surface is considered the dominant 
estate. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976). Therefore, it was 
unnecessary to reserve the right to enter the surface for mining operations if the Indenture 
conveyed fee title to the surface. 
Under Utah law, an easement is the dominant estate and the owner of the 
underlying title or servient estate may only use the property covered by the easement in a 
manner that will not interfere with the easement holder's use of the easement. Stevens v. 
Bird-Jex Company, 18 P.2d 292,294 (Utah 1933); and Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 
591 (Utah 1963). Since an easement is the dominant estate, the Indenture's expansive 
reservation of rights to use the surface for mining and other operations and the waiver of 
damages resulting from those uses was necessary to delineate the rights of the mineral and 
servient estate owner vis-a-vis the surface easement for grazing and agricultural purposes. 
The First Party's right to use the surface for mining and related purposes was to not be 
limited by the grant of grazing and agricultural rights in the surface under the Indenture. 
The deed construed in Haynes v. Hunt as granting an easement for the stated 
purposes also included a reservation "Reserving and excepting therefrom all grazing rights 
and privileges and the use of said waters for watering livestock." 85 P.2d at 862. The Utah 
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Supreme Court did not consider that reservation of rights to be inconsistent with its finding 
that the conveyance of land for the stated purposes granted only an easement. 
Missouri Flat also contends that the phrase in the reservation "as fully and 
entirely as if said First Party its successors and assigns remained the owner in fee simple of 
said surface, without any liability whatsoever on the part of the First Party" is inconsistent 
with an intent to convey only an easement. The district court interpreted that language to 
indicate the broadest possible right to use the surface for mining and other operations. [Order 
If 12, R. 818, 822; Reply to Supplementary Memorandum, R. 645, 655.] The Court's 
interpretation is supported by the classical definition of a fee simple estate as "the maximum 
legal ownership, and the greatest possible aggregate of rights, powers, privileges and 
immunities which a person may have in land." MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY 29 (West Publishing Co. 1962). This Court has utilized a similar definition 
in holding that the estate granted by a tax sale is "'fee simple' title - i.e., one unencumbered 
by other claims." A.C. Financial Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 776 (Utah 1997). 
The expansive recitation of uses that can be made of the surface for mining purposes seems 
clearly intended to ensure that the interest conveyed by the Indenture would not limit First 
Party's use of the surface for mining operations.1 
1
 It should be noted that the reservation contains language supporting the district 
court's interpretation, including the provision that First Party's use of the surface for 
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The district court interpreted the right to use the surface "as i f First Party 
owned fee title to mean as if First Party owned complete title unencumbered by the easement 
or other claims. This interpretation best follows the directive that documents are to be 
interpreted "so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, and all of its terms 
should be given effect if it is possible to do so." Buehner Block Company v. UWC Assoc, 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). "Each ... provision is to be considered in relation to all of 
the others with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Plateau Mining Co. v. 
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).2 
3. Haynes v. Hunt is Controlling Authority. 
In Haynes v. Hunt, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule of construction 
that if conveyance language in a deed includes a qualifying clause describing the use to be 
made of the property, the statement of use serves to qualify or limit the grant and changes the 
estate granted from fee title to an easement. 85 P.2d at 864. The Indenture is precisely that 
those purposes "will cause as little inconvenience to or interruption of the use of said 
surface" by Second Parties. (Addendum, Exhibit 1 (emphasis added).) 
2
 Even if the district court's interpretation of the "as if" reference is not considered the 
best interpretation standing alone, the other provisions that clearly indicate a grant of 
an easement would justify that interpretation. In Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 
160 P. 121 (1916), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "Moreover, where there are words 
or phrases found in different parts of a writing which are repugnant the courts must 
if possible, construe the whole instrument so that all of its parts may be brought in 
harmony and so that all of its parts may be given some meaning and effect, whether 
primary or secondary." Id. at 123. 
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kind of deed. There are no other reported Utah cases construing deeds that convey property 
for specified purposes, and therefore the rule of construction adopted in Haynes v. Hunt is 
controlling and should be followed as this Court interprets the Indenture. 
Missouri Flat argues Haynes v. Hunt is not controlling and tries to distinguish 
the case on the basis that all of the parties conceded that the deed in Haynes v. Hunt did not 
grant fee title. However, there is no indication that the Haynes Court limited its analysis on 
that basis. In fact it is clear the Court found the language used in that deed "normally implies 
the grant of the fee" but the "qualifying clause 'to be used for the propagation offish and the 
removal of the same' ... change[d] it from a fee to an easement." 85 P.2d at 864. Missouri 
Flat also claims there was no language in the deed in Haynes v. Hunt inconsistent with a 
grant of an easement. However, as noted above, the grantor in that deed reserved the right 
to use the property for "grazing rights" and for "watering livestock." Id. In this case, 
Missouri Flat has argued that reserving the right to use the surface for mining and related 
purposes is inconsistent with a grant of an easement. 
4. Missouri Flat Incorrectly Asserts that Several Utah Cases Support its claim that 
the Indenture Conveyed Fee Title to the Surface. 
Missouri Flat contends that in the case of Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 
1952), the Utah Supreme Court held the deed in question conveyed fee title despite the fact 
22 
that the "deed to Wood expressly stated that the object was to secure the land for water 
gathering purposes." (Aplt's Br. at 18 {emphasis added)) A careful reading of Wood, 
however, makes it clear the deed did not expressly state that the object was to secure land for 
water gathering purposes. Id. at 353. While it was acknowledged that the grantee's object 
in acquiring the land was for water gathering purposes, there is no indication that purpose 
was expressly stated in the conveyance language of the deed to Wood. Id. The full language 
of the deed is not quoted in the Wood opinion, but all references to the deed state it conveyed 
a strip of land referred to as strip A in fee simple. Id. at 352-54. 
The issue in Wood was the proper construction of the grantor's reservation of 
a "right of way for road purposes across" strip A, not the quantum of the interest or estate 
conveyed. The grantor's successor contended that although the deed conveyed fee title to 
strip A, the intent of the parties was for the grantor to retain the same right of way over strip 
A as he had before the conveyance. In response to that claim, the Wood Court stated: 
The deed in question granted a fee simple to Wood reserving a "right 
of way for road purposes across" the land conveyed. It is true that the 
objective of the grantee was to secure the land for water gathering 
purposes, but if the intent of the grantor was to use the land exactly as 
before, it seems more likely that an easement rather than a fee simple 
would have been granted to Wood. 
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Id. at 353. Thus, there was no express limitation in the conveyance. Because there was no 
limiting reference to the purpose of the conveyance, the Wood case does not support Missouri 
Flat's claim. 
Missouri Flat also argues the Utah Supreme Court relied on the rule of 
construction that a deed should be interpreted most strongly against the grantor in reaching 
its conclusion in Wood v. Ashby. (Aplt's Br. at 13). While the Court acknowledged that rule, 
there is no indication the Court reached its decision by construing the deed against the 
grantor. The Wood Court's statement on the rules of construction was as follows: 
It is generally conceded that a deed is to be construed most strongly 
against the grantor, and most favorably to the grantee. It is also 
established in this state that a deed should construed so as to effectuate 
the intentions and desires of the parties, as manifested by the language 
made use of in the deed. 
253 P.2d at 353 (internal citations omitted). As note above, the Wood Court concluded there 
was nothing in the deed which limited the estate conveyed. 
Missouri Flat also incorrectly represents the holding in Ruthrauffv. Silver King 
Western Mining & Milling Co., 80 P.2d 338 (Utah 1938), as supporting its interpretation of 
the Indenture. Missouri Flat contends the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
decision on the grounds that a deed which purported to "remise, release and quitclaim" an 
undivided interest "conveyed only a limited portion of the property." (Aplt's Br. at 8.) 
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Rather, in Ruthrauff'the claim was made that the intent and effect of the deed "was merely 
to release" an interest in property, and that it did not convey an interest in the property. The 
Utah Supreme Court held the deed conveyed any interest the grantor had, and that it was not 
merely a release. Id. at 342. 
Gold Mountain does not understand the point Missouri Flat tries to make with 
Ruthrauff 'and other cases in the same paragraph of its brief, unless it means to argue that 
there is sufficient language in the Indenture to convey fee title to the surface. Gold Mountain 
acknowledges that without the limiting clause "for grazing and agricultural purposes" the 
grant, bargain, and sale language in the Indenture is sufficient to convey fee title to the 
surface of the Property. That is exactly the point made by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Haynes v. Hunt, and it was the reason the Court concluded that language served no purpose 
except to limit the grant and change it from a fee estate to an easement. Haynes, 85 P.2d at 
864. 
B. THE CASE LAW CITED BY MISSOURI FLAT FROM OTHER STATES 
SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED. 
Missouri Flat's Brief relies to a great extent on cases from other states to assert 
that a grant of land for stated purposes does not limit the conveyance to an easement. In fact, 
the only cases it cites where a conveyance of land for a specified purpose did not create an 
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easement are from states other than Utah.3 Missouri Flat argues no public policy reason for 
adopting a rule of construction contrary to the rule of Hay nes v. Hunt. Instead, it quotes the 
statement from the California case ofCity of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 914 P.2d 
160 (Cal. 1996), that "[t]he vast majority of cases hold that the transfer of a fee title is not 
vitiated solely for the reason that the deeds contains a clause declaring the purpose for which 
it is intended the granted premises shall be used." [Aplt's Br. at 10.] {But see City of 
Manhattan Beach, 914 P.2d at 166 n.8 (describing the authorities as in "hopeless conflict" 
and that the interaction of the parties to the conveyance is of paramount importance)). 
To the contrary, the position taken by the California Supreme Court is not 
clearly supported by the "vast majority" of the cases from other states. Indeed, as footnote 8 
ofCity ofManhattan Beach states, "most out-of-state cases are of marginal relevance to [the] 
grantor's intent because each arises from a particular matrix of facts, which generates its own 
3
 Missouri Flat's brief cites the Utah cases of Coleman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 
505 (Utah 1976), and Draziach v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), to support its contention that a deed which contains a reference to specified 
land and not a right to use land indicates a grant in fee and not an easement. [Aplt's 
Br. at 9.] However, those cases only state that a deed is not effective if it does not 
contain an adequate legal description. Coleman, 556 P.2d at 505 (holding that 
quitclaim deeds were not invalid because property could be identified with reasonable 
certainty from description); Drazich, 964 P.2d at 326-27 (affirming trial court's 
decision that legal description was imprecise and conclusion that appellant did not 
have an interest in disputed land, and refusing to address issues of adverse possession 
and boundary by acquiescence that were not relied upon by the trial court in forming 
its decision). 
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individual rationale [and] [s]ome also depend upon policy or other considerations not 
pertinent to our evaluation." In the Washington case of Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908 (Wash. 
1996) (en banc) cited by Missouri Flat, the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
Many courts have considered whether a railroad deed conveys fee 
simple title or an easement. See A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Deed to 
Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 ALR 3d 973 
(1966). The decisions are in considerable disarray and usually turn on 
a case-by-case examination of each deed. 
924 P.2d at 911. The American Law Reports annotation referenced by the Washington 
Supreme Court reviews numerous cases interpreting deeds to railroad companies. In Section 
6[a] titled "Reference to Purpose of Conveyance," the Annotation states: 
There is an apparent divergence of opinion with respect to the effect of 
[conveyance] language. In some cases the view is taken that such 
language is merely descriptive of the use to which the land is to be put 
and has no effect to limit or restrict the estate conveyed; in others the 
view is taken that although such language may operate to reduce the fee 
created from a fee simple to a base, determinable, or conditional fee, it 
does not operate to restrict the estate transferred to a mere easement; 
and in others the position is taken that such language indicates an 
intention to covey an easement only and not a fee. 
A.E. Korpela, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 A.L.R. 3d 973, 996 
(1966-2004). See also City of Manhattan Beach, 914 P.2d at 166 n.8 (noting that [t]he 
authorities are in hopeless conflict [and] cannot be reconciled.) The Annotation then 
discusses the factors influencing the different interpretations and states "and particularly if 
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the reference to purpose was in the granting clause, many courts appear ready to construe the 
deed as conveying an easement." Id. § 5[a]. 
When the Utah Supreme Court adopted its rule of construction in Haynes v. 
Hunt, it relied on cases from other states and aligned itself with those that hold a conveyance 
of property with a statement of purpose serves to limit the estate conveyed to an easement 
for the stated uses. The rule articulated in Haynes v. Hunt is also supported by Powell's 
treatise on real property, which states as follows: 
A conveyance frequently requires careful scrutiny to determine which 
kind of interest was intended to be created by the parties. There is a 
general construction preference for one of two possible meanings 
which is "against the grantor." When, however, the problem requires 
distinguishing an "easement" from an "estate" the generally prevailing 
attitude is favorable to the finding of an easement wherever it serves the 
manifested purpose of the parties. Thus, a conveyance permitting the 
convey ee to make stated uses of the land, or even to have the exclusive 
use of the land for a particular purpose, is normally construed to create 
an easement, and to leave in the conveyor all privileges of use not 
inconsistent with the easement. 
POWELL ON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 34.04, at 34-40. 
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C. THE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION RELIED UPON BY MISSOURI FLAT 
DO NOT SUPPORT ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE INDENTURE. 
Missouri Flat cites various rules of construction to persuade the Court to favor 
its interpretation of the Indenture. However, those rules of construction are not applicable 
to the Indenture in this case. 
First, Missouri Flat relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3 and annotations to 
it. Section 57-1-3 states: 
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance 
of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate 
was intended. 
Id. (emphasis added). This statute does not support an interpretation that the Indenture 
conveyed a fee interest because the district court's order concluded that the language of the 
Indenture indicated that "a lesser state was intended." Both parties agree the Indenture 
limited the interest conveyed to the surface of the Property, and the issue was whether it was 
intended to convey a lesser estate in the surface. The statute does not impose a presumption 
in determining what estate is intended where there is language in the conveyance that limits 
the estate conveyed. 
Missouri Flat next relies uponJacobson, etal. v. Jacobson, etai, 557 P.2d 156 
(Utah 1976). The Court in Jacobson, however, did not interpret language used in a 
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conveyance. Instead, the deed in Jacobson conveyed unlimited fee title but the grantors 
sought to use parol evidence to show the document was intended to be an equitable mortgage 
and not a conveyance of title. Id. at 157. The other cases Missouri Flat cites along with 
Jacobson also involve attempts to use parol evidence to show an intent not reflected in the 
documents, and were not cases construing conveyance language. Those cases held the 
documents would be presumed to convey the interests stated, and that the party attempting 
to show a different intent by parol evidence had the burden of overcoming the presumption 
that the document means what it says, by clear and convincing evidence. That standard has 
not been applied to favor one construction over another in cases construing the language of 
a conveyance. Missouri Flat cites no case where the clear and convincing evidence standard 
was applied in construing the language of a deed. 
Missouri Flat also argues the Indenture is ambiguous and therefore the Court 
should rule in its favor based on the subsequent conduct of Missouri Flat and its 
predecessors. This argument is wholly inconsistent with Missouri Flat's representations in 
the telephonic hearing of April 16, 2003. The following dialogue took place during that 
hearing: 
THE COURT: Now, in terms of the status of this case, this is 
a Motion For Summary Judgment in which both sides are 
saying, "The deed says what it says and we're not offering any 
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extraneous evidence about the intention of the parties. Just look 
at the deed and try and determine what the intent of the parties 
was within the four corners of the document." Right, Mr. 
Russell? 
MR. RUSSELL: That's correct. 
Ah, the deed says what it says. It's a record. It's an old deed. I don't 
know that were gonna get a lot of, ah - - well, I don't know if extrinsic 
evidence would be admissible to show what the parties meant. But I 
don't know that we could find anybody to tell us what they thought. 
(T. 20-21.) Since Missouri Flat represented to the District Court that it was not offering any 
extrinsic evidence, it may not raise the issue on appeal. Oliphant v. Estate ofBrunetti, et al., 
2002 UT App 375, \ 22,64 P.3d 587 (party who did not argue parol evidence against motion 
for summary judgment below was precluded from raising it on appeal). 
Finally, Missouri Flat argues the Indenture should be construed most strongly 
against the grantor because the language of the Indenture either clearly shows the intent to 
convey fee title or it is ambiguous. That contention simply cannot be supported. An 
agreement or a contract provision is not ambiguous just because the parties disagree as to its 
meaning. Plateau Mining Co., 802 P.2d at 725. Also, arbitrary rules of construction such 
as construing a conveyance most strongly against the grantor should not be applied unless 
the intention of the grantor cannot be determined from the language of the deed. In 
Haynes v. Hunt, the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
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When the intention of the parties to a deed or contract can be 
ascertained from it, such intention will prevail, unless in contravention 
of some rule of law; and, when such intention can be ascertained, 
arbitrary rules of law are not to be invoked, and will not control the 
construction of the instrument. 
85 P.2d at 863 (quoting Kirwin v. Farr, 53 P. at 609). In Russell v. Geyser-Marion Gold 
Mining Co., 423 P.2d 487 (Utah 1967), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "This rule of 
construction favoring grantees is one of the last rules of construction that should be applied 
and need not be resorted to so long as a satisfactory result can be reached by other more 
reliable rules." Id. at 490. 
D. MISSOURI FLAT FAILED TO PRESERVE CLAIMS OF LACHES, 
ESTOPPEL AND ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Missouri Flat argues it is entitled to a trial on the merits of its claims of adverse 
possession, laches, and estoppel, contending that the trial court granted summary judgment 
on those issues. (Aplt's Br., pp. 22-23,27-28.) To the contrary, the trial court did not grant 
summary judgment on those issues but instead disposed of the claims because Missouri Flat 
had failed to pursue them. 
To properly preserve an issue for appellate review a party must raise it below 
such that the trial court is given "an opportunity to rule on [the] issue." Badger, et al. v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., et al, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). The purpose.of this rule is to put 
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the trial judge "on notice of the asserted error" and to allow "the opportunity for correction 
at that time in the course of the proceeding." Id. (quoting Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 
201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). For a trial court to be "afforded an opportunity to rule on the 
issue," the appellant must meet three (3) requirements. First, the issue must be raised in a 
timely fashion. Second, the issue must be "sufficiently raised . . . to a 'level of 
consciousness5 before the trial court. . .." Third, the appellant must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority to support its argument. Hart v. Salt Lake County 
Commission, et al, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Here, Missouri Flat cannot satisfy those requirements. First, the issues were 
not raised "timely" in response to the trial court's question at the hearing. While arguments 
of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel had been pleaded and addressed in Missouri 
Flat's briefing [Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. 447-457, and Memorandum in 
Opposition to Second MSJ, R. 659-777], its answer to the trial judge's question showed it 
had determined to no longer pursue the issues and that the trial court need not decide them. 
(T. 20-24.) Second, the same failure also demonstrates the issues were not sufficiently raised 
to a "level of consciousness" before the trial court. The purpose of these requirements is to 
give the trial court "the opportunity for a correction at that time in the course of the 
proceeding." Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (quoting Broberg, 782 P.2d at 201). When the trial 
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judge asked if there were any other issues to be decided, Missouri Flat's negative response 
removed those issues from the trial court's "level of consciousness," even assuming it had 
sufficiently raised them in the first place. Because Missouri Flat failed to timely bring those 
issues to the trial court's consciousness so they could be addressed before a final order was 
entered, it cannot now seek a trial on the merits of those claims. 
Moreover, when Gold Mountain submitted the proposed Order, Missouri Flat 
did not object that the Order would resolve the issues of adverse possession, laches, or 
estoppel. The trial court's Decision did not address any of those claims. ®. 804-08). If 
Missouri Flat intended to pursue them as it now contends on appeal, its duty was to object 
to the proposed Order or otherwise raise to a "level of consciousness" the trial court's lack 
of ruling on the issues. Only by so doing would the trial court have had the "opportunity for 
a correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Missouri Flat's failure to do so was 
a consent to the Order against it on the issues of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel.4 
4
 This Court has held that the "mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the 
claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue 
for appeal." LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., et al, 823 P.2d 
479,483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In this action, the matter was decided after a hearing 
on dispositive motions and not at trial. The rule articulated in LeBaron required 
Missouri Flat to raise "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority" at the hearing, 
and not simply to rely upon the mention of those issues in its briefing, to preserve the 
issues of laches, estoppel, and adverse possession for appellate review. 
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Finally, it should be clear that Gold Mountain's proposed Order was not 
submitted with the intent to take advantage of Missouri Flat on those issues, nor did it have 
that effect. Missouri Flat's amended pleading before the trial court raised multiple claims 
as parties commonly do. However, its arguments at the hearing focused entirely on the 
interpretation of the Indenture, and its representations to the trial court indicated it had 
determined not to pursue the issues of adverse possession, laches, or estoppel. Because this 
action was filed to quiet title to the underlying property, the trial court's Decision needed to 
be implemented by an order which addressed all claims Missouri Flat had asserted, even if 
some were later abandoned. Moreover, the Order would not be final under Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless it disposed of all claims between the parties. Bradbury, 
et al v. Valencia, et al, 2000 UT 50, f 10, 5 P.3d 649 ("To be final, the trial court's order or 
judgment must dispose of all parties and claims to an action.") 
For those reasons, Gold Mountain's proposed Order presented the simple 
conclusions that "Gold Mountain's claims against Missouri Flat in this matter are not barred 
by latches [sic] or estoppel" and that "Missouri Flat has not established any rights or title in 
the Subject Property . . . by adverse possession." (Addendum, Exhibit 3.) The Order was 
entered without any objection by Missouri Flat. Therefore, the Court should conclude that 
Missouri Flat abandoned its claims of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel in the trial 
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court and failed to preserve them for appellate review. 
E. MISSOURI FLAT CANNOT PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIM OF TITLE BASED 
ON ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The critical aspect of Missouri Flat's adverse possession argument is that it 
claims title beyond the rights granted under the Indenture as interpreted by the district court. 
Missouri Flat argued below that "[E]ven if the Court were to adopt the interpretation of the 
Indenture proposed by plaintiff, Missouri Flat and its predecessors have overcome any 
limitation in the language of the Indenture by adverse possession." [Supplementary 
Memorandum, R. 477.] Thus, the argument presumes Gold Mountain is the owner of legal 
title to the surface of the Property, subject to an easement to use the surface for grazing and 
agricultural purposes and to cut and remove aspen and chaparral trees. As the owner of legal 
title, Gold Mountain is entitled to the presumptions of possession afforded by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-7 as follows: 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession 
thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by 
law; and the occupation of the property by any other person shall be 
deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, 
unless it appears that the property has been held and possessed 
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the commencement 
of the action. 
Id. 
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Utah courts have held that to overcome the presumption of possession under 
the statute, the party claiming adverse possession "must be able to show possession such that 
the legal titleholder is put on notice" that he is claiming adversely to the legal titleholder. 
Such notice must be based on "conduct clearly inconsistent with the rights of the titleholder." 
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1982). In the recent case of Salt Lake County v. 
Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, f23, 89 P.3d 155, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that to overthrow the presumption that the adverse party is not under subordination to the 
legal owner's title, the party claiming adversely has the burden to establish the fact by 
competent evidence. Id. (quoting English v. Openshaw, 28 Utah 241, 78 P. 476, 477 
(1904)). Because of the gravity of adverse possession claims - wresting title from otherwise 
rightful owners - claimants must strictly comply with all legal requirements. Metro West, 
2004 UT 23, f 23 (quoting Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 93 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). 
Missouri Flat does not claim it or its predecessors have occupied or possessed 
the Property for any purpose other than for grazing livestock. The use of the surface for 
grazing livestock is deemed to be pursuant to the easement granted since the Indenture 
expressly grants the right to use the surface for grazing and agricultural purposes. Therefore, 
such use and possession has not been hostile or adverse to Gold Mountain. Missouri Flat and 
its predecessors have done nothing to invade Gold Mountain's non-grazing and non-
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agricultural interests in the surface in such a manner as would give notice of an adverse 
claim. Without possession that is clearly adverse to Gold Mountain's fee interest and 
presumed possession, Missouri Flat cannot succeed in its claim for adverse possession as a 
matter of law.5 
Missouri Flat also claims the benefit of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-8 because it 
entered upon the surface under a claim of title. As noted above, it cannot use the Indenture 
to support a claim of title because its claim of adverse possession is based on the presumption 
that the Indenture granted an easement and First Party retained legal title. A grant of an 
easement cannot be used to support a claim of title because an easement is not considered a 
fee title interest. Chournos, et al v. D 'Angillo, et ai, 642 P.2d 710,712 (Utah 1982) (a right 
of way is an easement not an interest in fee simple). 
Missouri Flat also asserts it entered possession under claim of title based on 
the Trustee's Deed by which it acquired its interest in the surface of the subject property. 
5
 Because Missouri Flat has a right to use the surface under the easement, this situation 
is similar to cotenancy cases where the occupying cotenant that has a right of 
possession is claiming adversely to the other cotenants. The Utah Courts have stated 
in those cases that for the occupying cotenant's possession to be considered adverse 
to the other co-tenants "the words or acts must be openly direct and hostile to the 
cotenancy relationship." Massey v. Prothero, et ai, 664 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 
1983). Missouri Flat has not asserted any use except that granted by the easement 
which clearly is not conduct directly hostile to Gold Mountain's title to the servient 
estate. 
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However, since the Trustee's Deed is effective as of July 19,1994, and this action was filed 
in March, 2000, Missouri Flat cannot claim to have possessed the surface under the Trustee's 
Deed for the seven years required by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-8. 
It is correct that the parties "disagree on the evidence concerning the payment 
of taxes" on the surface of the Property. (Aplt's Br., pp. 22-23, 27-28.) However, even if 
Missouri Flat could show it had paid all taxes on the surface, the Utah Supreme held in 
Dillman v. Foster that the "payment of taxes, standing alone, is insufficient to support" a 
claim of adverse possession. 656 P.2d at 980. Since Missouri Flat cannot show that it has 
possessed the surface adversely to Gold Mountain, the conflicting claims of payment of taxes 
do not have to be addressed for this Court to rule against Missouri Flat's claim of adverse 
possession. 
F. MISSOURI FLAT CANNOT PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIMS OF LACHES OR 
ESTOPPEL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that to successfully assert laches two 
elements must be established: "(1) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2) An injury 
to the defendant owing to such lack of diligence." Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc, et aL, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975); see also 
Plateau Mining, 802 P.2d at 731. 
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Missouri Flat cannot show unreasonable lack of diligence or injury. Since 
Missouri Flat and its predecessors have done nothing to give Gold Mountain or its 
predecessors notice that they claimed more than the right to use the Subject Property for 
grazing purposes, nothing has happened that would require diligence in making further 
inquiry as to the interests claimed or in bringing an action to confirm the rights of the parties. 
Missouri Flat's only claim of injury is that there has been a "loss of relevant witnesses." 
However, as noted above, Missouri Flat informed the district court that the Indenture was to 
be construed based on the language of the Indenture and it was not offering any extraneous 
evidence about the intention of the parties. Therefore loss of relevant witnesses is a non-
issue. 
Estoppel is an equitable defense that is similar to laches but requires more than 
mere delay. As Missouri Flat notes in its brief the requirements for estoppel are: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting 
from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement, or act. 
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Division of State Lands and Forestry, et al.9 886 P.2d 514, 522 
(Utah 1994). Missouri Flat notes that the first requirement can be met by failure to act, but 
that applies only if the party otherwise has a duty to act. Morgan, et al v. Board of State 
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Lands, et al, 549 P.2d 695,697 (Utah 1976) ("or by his silence when he ought to speak..."). 
The Morgan case also requires that the person claiming reliance must "act[] with reasonable 
prudence and diligence" based upon such failure to act. Id. 
Because Missouri Flat's only basis for claiming estoppel is silence or inaction 
on the part of Gold Mountain and its predecessors, it must show there was "silence when 
[they] ought to speak" that "induced" Missouri Flat and its predecessors to act "with 
reasonable prudence and diligence" to their detriment. Here there is no relationship between 
Gold Mountain or its predecessors and Missouri Flat or its predecessors that imposes any 
duty to speak or act or inquire as to the interest Missouri Flat and its predecessors believed 
they owned in the Property. Missouri Flat does not allege that either it or its predecessors, 
or Gold Mountain or its predecessors, have acted in any way inconsistent with the rights 
granted and reserved by the Indenture as construed by the district court. In addition, there 
has been no cognizable injury. The claim of injury is deterioration of evidence due to loss 
of relevant witnesses. However, under the claims made in this case, the testimony of such 
witnesses would be irrelevant. 
Missouri Flat has cannot support its claims of laches or estoppel, and the district court 
properly disposed of them in its Order. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: RELIEF SOUGHT. 
The district court's order should be affirmed and this Court should rule that the 
Indenture granted to Missouri Flat's predecessors (Second Parties) an easement for the uses 
specified in the Indenture, that it conveyed fee title to the house and the land on which it sits, 
and that Gold Mountain's predecessor (First Party) retained all other rights and ownership 
in the Property. That interpretation of the Indenture is in harmony with controlling Utah case 
law and is necessary to give meaning and effect to all provisions of the Indenture. Case law 
from other states that is contrary to Utah case law should be disregarded. 
The district court's Order regarding adverse possession, laches, and estoppel 
should be affirmed. Missouri Flat has abandoned those claims in the trial court and has not 
preserved them for appellate review. Moreover, the facts cannot support those claims on the 
merits, and the district court properly disposed of them against Missouri Flat. 
42 
DATED this / S ^ a y of November, 2004. 
W_ 
RICHARD G. ALLEN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
( 
MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
Attorneys for Gold Mountain 
Development LLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J ^ ^ d a y of November, 2004, two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, were served by United States mail, 
first class postage prepaid, on the following: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Esq. 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
G:\EDSI\DOCS\16013\0001\ER7449.WPD 
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Tabl 
...u U.^T ^ iu«uMj.«v<K«u v« aw vn«* ne execucea cne as Guardian of the Estate of 
Max Xrotki, an Incompetent. 
Residing at* Richfield, Utah 
<«*«« ^  ^ i j s sra i i i e 
Ify- commission e x p i r e s t 
Ma/ 8 , 19*3 
^leco-ded a t t h e r e q u e s t o f CARVEL MATTSSON t h i s l 6 t h day o f J u l y A . D . , 19*1 a t 1 : 0 0 P . K. 
IUTE COUNTT RJBCORDSR Pit/' 
S . 3 . #62039 
THIS INDENTURE made t h i s 26 th day o f A p r i l , A.D. 1 9 5 1 , by and between ANNIE LAURIE CONSOLIDATED 
GOLD MINES, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , F i r s t P a r t y , and FRANKLIN TAFT PAIION, CLAINE TAD PAXTON, GENEVIEVE P. 
RAJSON, and OERALDINS PAXTON, a l l o f Kanoah, Utah, Second P a r t i e s , 
W I T N E S S E T H * 
That First Party, e ipressly subject to the exceptions and reservations in favor of First Party 
i t s successors and assigns hereinafter mentioned and set forth , for and m consideration of the sum of 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000 00) and other good and valuable considerations paid by Second Barties , the 
receipt whereof i s hereby acknowledged, hereby grants, bargains, s e l la and conveys unto Second Parties , 
for grazing and agricultural purposes, the surface of the following described Patented Lode Mining Claima 
in Gold Mountain Mining Di s tr i c t , and the surface only of the Other Property described below, with the 
right to cut and remove from the surface of oaid Patented Lode Mining Claime and Other Property any or 
a l l of the quaking aspen and chaparral thereon, a l l of said mining claims and property being situated 
in Piute and Sevier Counties, State of Utah, to-witi 
Patented Lode Mining Claimsr 
Sevier, Gulch, Adaline and Sevier Mill Si te in 0*. S. Lot #37. 
Blue Bird, Red Bird, Blue Bird Fraction, Last Chance, Grass Hopper and Frank Jay in 
<J. 3 . Lot #3U88. 
L i l l i a n , Senator Stewart, Annie Laurie, Chief Devora, Royal George, National, H. S. & S, 
Overland and Minnie "Maude in U. S. Lot #3207. 
Lincoln and Garfield in U. S. Lot #Uul9. 
Sevier Extension, Pointer, Erie , Erie Fraction, Sevier Extension Group and Sevier 
Consolidated Mill Site in U. S. Lots Nos. u69u~A, u69u~B and U69U-C. 
Fraction A, Gold Mountain H. 4. J . t Pioneer Mine, Utica No. 1, Utxca Ittne Ho. 2 and 
W. F. in U. 3 . Lots Nos. U710 and U769. 
Dunmore, Bunker Hi l l , Free Prees and Fourth of July in U. 3 . Lot #UU21. 
Senator Cannon in U. S, Lot #Ulil5« 
Rolling Hi l l s No. 2, Rolling H i l l s , Weber, Maid of the Mist No. 2 , Maid of the Mist 
«o. u, Hi l l s ide No. 3 , riillaiae Ho. u) Jessie No. 6, Stanley, ICua of the Mist, 
H i l l s i d e , Hil ls ide No. 2 , Jess ie No. 5 , Jessie No. 1 , Jessie No. 2 , Jess ie No. 3 | 
Jess ie No. U and Maid of the Mist No. 3 in U. 3 . Lots Hoa^ l*l<01 and uixl6. 
Roiling Hi l l s No. U, Rolling Hi l l s No. 3 , Gold Bird No. 2, Rolling Hi l l s No. 6, Rolling 
Hi l l s No. $, Weber No. 2 and ffeber No. 3 in U. S. Lots Host Ukh2, Uh$) and hh$$. 
Pride of America No. 3 , Pnde of America No. 2 , Maid of the Mist Ho. $, Maid of the Mist 
No. 6 , Hil ls ide No. $, Hi l l s ide No. 7, Hil ls ide No. 6, Hillside No. 8. Jessie No. 7 , 
Exhibit C 
Jessie No. 8, Je*,-ie No. 9, Jessie No. 10 and Gold Bird Nos. 3 to 18, bo^ ,i inclusive, 
in U. S. Lots Nos. UUi2, UtS3 and Ui$5. 
Bird of all Birds in U. S. Lot #Ut62. 
James G. Blaine, Surprise, Outzen, II. J. & S., Hazel Kirk, Morton, Lookout, Snow 
Girl and Mogul in U. S. Lots U291 and 1*301. 
Blue Ledge, Lookout, No. 1, No. 2, Miller Fraction, Southerly Extension of No. 2, 
No. 1 Fraction, Extension of the Erie, Ute Fraction, Ote, Blister, and Fish Creek 
Millsite in U. 8. Lots Nos. hh30A and UU30B. 
Gold City in U. S. Lot No. 3851. 
Holland and Placer Gulch in U. S. Lot No. 333b. 
Deer Park and D. J. in 0. S. Lot No. Ui$7. 
Dandy Quill in U. S. Lot No. 38$0. 
Outzen Fraction in U. S. Lot No. It96$# 
Tom Boy and Edith in U. S. Lot No. It939. 
Good Enough, Horse Shoe, Horse Shoe Fraction No. 2, Geo. S. Fraction, Crown Point, 
Palmer G. Breckenridge No. 2, Basin Fraction, Fort Dodge, Mineral Point, Statehood, 
Good Enough Fraction, Horse Shoe Fraction, Geo. S., Oro Chain, Mascot Fraction, 
Palmer G. Fraction, Basin, Capt. Dodge, Dodge Fraction, Mineral Point Fraction and 
Mammoth in u\ S. Lot No. 6uUiu 
Overland Fraction In 0. S. Lot No. 1*586. 
Together with the one story frame house located in Upper Klmberly at the fork of the road 
Leading to Sevier and Marysvale, Utah. 
Other Propertyt 
The North one-half, and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, and Lots 1, 
2, 3, u, and $ of. Section 36, Townahip 26 South, Range $ Wast, Salt Lake Meridian, 
And for the consideration aforesaid First Party hereby conveys and quit claims unto Second 
Parties, for gracing and agricultural purposes, the surface of the .following described patented lode 
mining Claims in Gold Mountain Mining District situate in Piute County, Utaht 
Annie Mine, Geneva, Fenny Mining Claim and Switzerland, Survey No. $297. 
Columbia Mine, Yukon Mine, U. S« Treasury Mine, Britannia, Klondike Mine, Bank of 
England,- excluded area in conflict with $139 LeRoy Mining Claim, Sur. No. $0U5 
Halifax No. 6 - Sunr. No. $17l». 
EXPRSSSLT EXCEPTING AND RESERVING HOWEVER, unto the said First Party its successors and assigns, 
all mines and minerals of whatsoever kii*d at Aatura situata, lying or being on, in sr \<nd*r all or any 
of the patented lode mining claims and other property above described, together with the righ* and priv-
ileges at all times for First Party its successors and assigns and its and their agents and workmen to 
enter into and upon all or any of said patented lode mining claims and other property hereinabove des-
cribed or any part thereof, and to search for, work, mine, develop, remove, extract, store, treat, mill 
and carry away all said mines and minerals of whatever kind or nature the same may be., and to sink pits 
and shafts, and to make and drive tunnels, drifts, winzes and other underground workings of every kind, 
and to occupy and use such parts of the surface hereby conveyed for the construction of such roads and 
_.„.., «.»« u^«3r structures, pipe* {tourer 
and transmission lines *>s, tailinga ponds, and other facilities, aa may b. /ceaaary in connection 
with any of aaid mining, milling, or other operationa, aa fully and entirely aa if a aid Firat Party ita 
aucceaaora and aaalgna remained the owner in fee aimple of aaid surface, without any liability whatever 
on the part of Firat Party ita aucceaaora or aaalgna to Second Parties and their respective heirs, exec-
utors, adminiatratora and aaalgna, for any loaa, damage or injury that may occur to any property o£ Second 
Parties and their reapective heira, executors, adminiatratora and aaalgna, or to aaid surface by reason 
of searching for, working, developing, mining, extracting, atoring, treating, milling, removing and 
carrying away all of aaid minea and minerals of every kind or nature, and/or utilizing aaid surface aa 
aforeaaid in connection therewith, provided, however, Firat Party ita aucceaaora and aasigna ahall conduct 
all of said searching, developing, working, mining, atoring, treating, milling, removing and transporting 
operations and all acts and things connected therewith or incidental thereto in such manner as will cause 
as little inconvenience to or interruption of the use of said Surface by Second Partiea and their reapect-
ive heirs, executors, adminiatratora and aaalgna aa la conaiatent with the proper conduct and carrying on 
of any of aaid mining, milling, or other operationa. 
Second Partiea are h-rsby given the right to use, for stock watering purposes, such water rights 
as First Party may have that are available and applicable for auch purposes, provided, however, Second 
Parties, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, ahall not do or permit anything to be done 
which will in any manner or to any extent impair or destroy any of the water rights of First Party, and 
First Party its succeasors and assigns shall not be liable or reaponaible for any failure or dlarlnution of 
any of said water rlghta, and provided further that aaid right of Second Partiea to ao uae said water 
rights shall not In any manner or to any extent interfere with or prevent the uae thereof for mining or 
milling operations by First Party it successors and assigns on any part of the property of First Part, 
This conveyance is made expreasly aubjectt 
(a) to any and all property taxes or other taxes that may be levied or assessed 
for the year 1951 and thereafter upon any of the surface rights hereby convevedj 
(b) To all existing highways, roads, easements and rights of way and subject to 
the right of First Party, its aucceaaora or aasigna, to use and enjoy auch highwaya, 
roads, easements and rights of way in common with others} and 
(c) To the right of First Party, its successors and assigns to enter into and 
upon the surface hereby conveyed for the purpose of dismantellng or removing any and 
all buildings and other structures (excepting on ly the one story frame house located 
in Upper Kimberly at the fork of the road leading to Sevier and Uarysvalt, Utah), 
machinery, equipment, supplies, pipe, power, transmission and other lines, and any and 
all other personal property situated upon any part of the aurf ace hereby conveyed. 
TO HAVE AMD TO HOLD the above deacribed aurf ace and building hereby conveyed unto Second Parties, 
their heirs, executors, adminiatratora and assigns forever, subject to the aforesaid exceptions, reser-
vations and restrictions* 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, First Party has caused these presents to be executed in its corporate name 
by its proper officers thereunto duly author!ted and its corporate seal to be hereto affixed the day and 
year first above written* 
$22,00 in U. S. Revenue 
ATTEST? Stamps Attached ANHIE LAURIE CONSOLIDATED GOLD JOKES 
Robert E. Mark (CORPORATE SEAL) By Charlea L* Wheeler 
President 
STATS OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTT OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 16th day of May, 1951, personally appeared before me Charlea L. Wheeler who being by me 
duly sworn did say that he is the President of Annie Laurie Consolidated Qold Mines, and that the within 
going instruiaent was signed in ^half of said corporation by authority ot resolution of its 
directors and said Charles L„ Iheeler duly acknowledged to me that .said corporation executed 
and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation* 
SEAL) Paul S« Roberts 
Notary Public For the State of 
ssion Expiresr u t a h» residing at Uurray City, Utah 
11, 1951 
at the request of Taft Paxton this 20th day of July A«D., 1951 at lOtOO A« M* 
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1 DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000600006 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
Cross-motions for summary judgment require me to interpret a document. There is no 
dispute about the words in the document, neither is it claimed to be ambiguous. The document is 
entitled "Indenture." It is a title transfer document. I will refer to it as a deed. The grantor was 
plaintiffs predecessor. The grantee was defendant Missouri Flat's predecessor. 
The dispute centers on this question: Who owns the land? 
Plaintiff wants this Court to sign 
[5.] A judgment and decree quieting fee title ... in Plaintiff, subject to the 
easements for grazing and agricultural purposes and to cut and remove quaking 
aspen and chaparral now owned by [defendant].... (Language taken directly from 
paragraph 5 of the Prayer for Relief in the Complaint filed April 4, 2000) 
The defendant wants the Court to 
... [E]nter ... a decree ... declaring that [defendant] is the owner all of surface rights ... 
DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Case number 000600006, Page -2-
(From paragraph b. or the Prayer for Relief in the Counterclaim filed May 5,2000) 
In other words, defendant wants to own the entire surface. Plaintiff wants to own the land, 
but the ownership would be subject to defendant's right to use the surface for certain purposes. 
The deed is a long and wordy document. In it, the phrase "First Party" refers to Plaintiff, 
while "Second Parties" refers to Defendant. I have used my word processor to key in almost 
every word in i t (I will include this work as an endnote to this decision.)1 Then I have removed 
words not essential to my analysis. Here is the result (with emphasis on certain words added by 
me): 
First Party ... hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto Second 
Parties, for grazing and agricultural purposes, the surface of..., with the right 
to cut and remove from the surface ... any or all of the quaking aspen and 
chaparral thereon.... 
Patented Lode Mining Claims 
(A list whose details are not important to my analysis) 
Together with the one story frame house located in .... 
Other Property: 
(A list as above.) 
... RESERVING-., unto the ... First Party ... the right and privilege ... to 
enter ... upon ... and to occupy ... such parts of the surface ... as may be necessary 
... as fully and entirely as if... First Party... had remained the owner .... 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described surface and building ... 
unto Second Parties ... forever, subject to the ... exceptions, reservations and 
restrictions. 
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I conclude that defendant owns the following: 
1. The frame building and that portion of the surface which it covers in fee 
simple absolute; and 
2. a permanent easement to use all the rest of the surface for grazing and 
agricultural purposes, subject to plaintiffs right to enter for certain 
purposes. 
Here are the reasons why I have reached my conclusion. First, the plain language of the 
deed indicates that the grantor intended to convey something less than the full rights to the 
surface. The specific words are, "First Party ... sells ... unto Second Parties, for grazing and 
agricultural purposes ...." The limiting phrase is that which is shown in bold face. It begins 
with the word "for," which means "used as a function word to indicate purpose." From Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com. The limiting phrase is positioned within 3 
words of the transfer verb "sells." 
The use of the word "for" was intended to show the purpose for which the surface could 
be used. By the same token, it excludes all other such purposes. 
Second, the grantor reserved something unto itself. Specifically, the grantor reserved 
unto itself the right to enter and to occupy. Such a reservation can only be consistent with a grant 
of less than the full rights to the surface. 
Third, the use of the words "to have and to hold ..." do not necessarily mean that the grant 
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is one of fee simple absolute. It appears to me that that which was granted forever was "the 
above described surface," the rights to which had already been described and limited. 
Fourth, it appears that the grant of the building was made in fee simple absolute as to the 
surface because it was permanently attached to the land and the grantor must have wanted to give 
the grantee exclusive use and control of it. 
Mr. Allen is appointed to draft an appropriate order and to submit it for execution by 
following the procedures set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. 
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Lehi, Utah 84043 
Telephone: (801) 766-1580 
Fax: (801) 407-8380 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR PIUTE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GOLD MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT ! 
LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MISSOURI FLAT LTD., a Utah Limited 
Partnership, TERREL WOODARD 
SANDBERG and CYNTHIA CRANE 
SANDBERG, husband and wife, 
individuals, WILLIAM OHLINGER, an 
individual, KIMBERLY GOLD, INC, a 
New York Corporation, and DOES I TO X, 
parties unknown, 
Defendants, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER AND DECREE 
Civil No. 000600006 
Judge David L. Mower 
Cross-motions for Summary Judgment were filed by plaintiff Gold Mountain 
Development, LLC ("Gold Mountain") and defendant Missouri Flat Ltd ("Missouri Flat") in 
the above entitled matter and several hearings have been held on those motions. Gold 
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Mountain was represented by Richard G. Allen. Missouri Flat was represented by Warren 
Peterson and Richard Waddingham of Waddingham & Peterson and by Ronald Russell of Parr 
Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. 
After reviewing the cross-motions and the memoranda, exhibits and affidavits in 
support of the same and considering the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the 
premises and for good cause shown, the Court makes the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order and decree in this matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Gold Mountain filed this action to clear up title problems set out in the Complaint 
and to quiet title in Gold Mountain to certain patented mining claims and other real property 
described in Exhibit A to the Complaint (the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property is 
also described in EXHIBIT A hereto. 
2. Gold Mountain has obtained judgment against or dismissed all defendants except for 
Missouri Fiat. 
3. Gold Mountain seeks a judgment and decree quieting title to the Subject Property in 
Gold Mountain subject to easements in Missouri Fiat for grazing and agricultural purposes and 
to cut and remove quaking aspen and chaparral. 
4. Missouri Fiat seeks a decree declaring that Missouri Flat is the owner of all surface 
rights in the Subject Property subject to certain rights of Gold Mountain to use the surface for 
mining purposes. 
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5. The dispute over the rights to the surface of the Subject Property originate in a 
document referred to as an Indenture dated April 26, 1951 and recorded July 20, 1951 at Book 
J of Mining, Page 615 of the records of the Piute County Recorder's Office (the "Indenture"). 
6. Gold Mountain is the successor in interest to the "First Party", the grantor, in the 
Indenture. 
7. Missouri Flat is the successor in interest to the "Second Parties", the grantees, in 
the Indenture. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter. 
2. The cross-motions for summary judgment warrant the Court's granting of summary 
judgment in this matter. 
3. Gold Mountain's claims against Missouri Flat in this matter are not barred by 
latches or estoppel. 
4. The Indenture is not ambiguous and its meaning can be determined by construction 
of the terms of the Indenture. 
5. The plain language of the Indenture indicates that the grantor intended to convey 
something less than the full rights to the surface. The specific words are, "First Party ... sells 
... unto Second Parties, for grazing and agricultural purposes ... ." The limiting phrase 
being for grazing and agricultural purposes. The limiting phrase begins with the word "for," 
which means "used as a function word to indicate purpose." Merriam-Webster Online 
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Dictionary, hitp; www.m-w.com. The limiting phrase is positioned within 3 words of the 
transfer verb "sells." 
6. The use of the word "for" was intended to show the purpose for which the surface 
could be used. By the same token, it excludes all other such purposes. 
7. The grantor reserved something unto itself. Specifically, the grantor reserved unto 
itself the right to enter and to occupy. Such a reservation can only be consistent with a grant 
of less than the full rights to the surface. 
8. The use of the words "to have and to hold..." do not necessarily mean that the 
grant is one of fee simple absolute. It appears that that which was granted forever was the 
"the above described surface," the rights to which had already been described and limited. 
9. It appears that the grant of the building was made in fee simple absolute as to the 
surface because it was permanently attached to the land and the grantor must have wanted to 
give the grantees the exclusive use and control of it. 
10. Based on the above construction of the Indenture, Missouri Flat owns the 
following rights and interests in the Subject Property: 
a. The one story frame house located in the Upper Kimberly at the fork of the road 
leading to Sevier and Marys vale, Utah and that portion of the surface which it 
covers in fee simple absolute; 
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b. A permanent easement to use the rest of the surface for grazing and agricultural 
purposes, subject to Gold Mountain's right to enter the surface for mining and 
other purposes as set out in the Indenture; and 
c. A permanent right and easement to cut and remove from the surface all of the 
quaking aspen and chaparral thereon. 
11. Missouri Flat has not established any rights or title in the Subject Property beyond 
the rights granted by the Indenture by adverse possession. 
12. Based on the above construction of the Indenture, Gold Mountain owns in fee 
simple absolute all other rights and interests, including the surface, in and to the Subject 
Property subject only to the rights of Missouri Flat in the Subject Property set out in 
paragraph 10. 
ORDER AND DECREE 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The cross-motions for summary judgment by Gold Mountain and Missouri Flat are 
granted and denied to the extent that the Court finds that the rights and title to the Subject 
Property are owned and held as herein provided. 
2. Gold Mountain is the owner in fee simple absolute and is entitled to possession of 
and title to all rights and interests, including the surface, in and to the Subject Property as 
described in EXHIBIT A attached hereto to and made a part hereof subject only to the rights 
of Missouri Flat in the Subject Property set out below. 
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3. Missouri Flat is the owner of and is entitled to possession of and title to the 
following rights and interests in the Subject Property: 
a. The one story frame house located in the Upper Kimberly at the fork of the road 
leading to Sevier and Marysvale, Utah and that portion of the surface which it 
covers in fee simple absolute; 
b. A permanent easement to use the rest of the surface for grazing and agricultural 
purposes, subject to Gold Mountain's right to enter the surface for mining and 
other purposes as set out in the Indenture; and 
c. A permanent right and easement to cut and remove from the surface all of the 
quaking aspen and chaparral thereon. 
DATED 4dC & 2003 
BY THE COURT 
LAP^UU 
DilfcvieHl Mower 
District Court Judge 
° ^ ^ o 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order and Decree was mailed, postage prepaid, on this ffi^day of June, 2003 to the 
following: 
Ronald G. Russell 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019 
Warrant G. Peterson 
Richard Waddingham 
WADDINGHAM & PETERSON 
362 West Main Street 
Delta, UT 84624 
2003171.L 
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EXHIBIT A 
Patented Mining Claims 
(Piute County) 
CLAIM NAME MINERAL SURVEY NO. 
FRACTION A 4769 & 4710 
GOLD MOUNTAIN H&J 
PIONEER MINE 
UTICANO. 1 
UTICA NO. 2 
W. F. LODE 
BIRD OF ALL BIRDS 4462 
BLUE LEDGE 4430A & 4430B 
LOOKOUT 
NO. 1 
NO. 2 
MILLER FRACTION 
SOUTHERLY EXTENSION OF NO. 2 
NO. I FRACTION 
EXTENSION OF THE ERIE 
UTE 
UTE FRACTION 
BLISTER 
FISH CREEK MILL SITE 
DANDY QUILL 3850 
SEVIER EXTENSION 4694-A, 4694-B & 4694-C 
ERIE 
ERIE FRACTION 
POINTER 
SEVIER EXTENSION GROUP 
SEVIER CONSOLIDATED MILL SITE 
MAMMOTH 6444 
HORSE SHOE 
HORSE SHOE FRACTION 
PALMER G. 
PALMER G. FRACTION 
EXHIBIT A, Page I 
CLAIM NAME MINERAL SURVEY NO. 
HORSE SHOE FRACTION NO. 2 6444 (continued) 
ORO CHAIN 
GEORGE S. 
GEORGE S. FRACTION 
GOOD ENOUGH 
GOOD ENOUGH FRACTION 
CAPTAIN DODGE 
BASIN MINING CLAIM 
MINERAL POINT 
CROWN POINT 
MINERAL POINT FRACTION 
BASIN FRACTION 
BRACKENRIDGE NO. 2 
MASCOT FRACTION 
STATEHOOD 
DODGE FRACTION 
FORT DODGE 
RED BIRD 3488 
BLUEBIRD 
BLUE BIRD FRACTION 
FRANK JAY 
GRASSHOPPER 
LAST CHANCE 
OUTZEN FRACTION 4965 
BUNKERHELL 4421 
DUNMORE 
FREE PRESS 
FOURTH OF JULY 
TOM BOY 4939 
EDITH 
DEER PARK 4457 
D.J. 
SENATOR CANNON 4415 
LINCOLN 4419 
EXHIBIT A, Page 2 
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CLAIM NAME MINERAL SURVEY NO. 
GARFIELD 4419 (continued) 
SEVIER 37 
GULCH 
AD ALINE 
SEVIER MILLSITE 
ROLLING HELLS NO. 2 4401 & 4416 
ROLLING HELLS 
WEBER 
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 2 
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 4 
HILLSIDE NO. 3 
HILLSIDE NO. 4 
JESSIE NO. 6 
STANLEY 
MAID OF THE MIST NO. 3 
HILLSIDE NO. 2 
HILLSIDE 
JESSIE NO. 1 
JESSIE NO. 2 
JESSIE NO. 3 
JESSIE NO. 4 
JESSIE NO. 5 
MAED OF THE MIST 
ROLLING HELLS NO. 3 4453 
ROLLING HELLS NO. 4 
GOLD BERD NO. 2 
ROLLING HELLS NO. 5 
ROLLING HELLS NO. 6 
WEBER NO. 2 4442 
WEBER NO. 3 
PREDE OF AMERICA NO. 2 
PRJDE OF AMERICA NO. 3 
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 5 
MAED OF THE MIST NO. 6 
HILLSIDE NO. 5 
HILLSIDE NO. 6 
HILLSIDE NO. 7 
EXHIBIT A, Page 3 
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CLAIM NAME 
HILLSIDE NO.: 
JESSIE NO. 7 
JESSIE NO. 8 
JESSIE NO. 9 
JESSIE NO. 10 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
GOLD 
BIRD NO. 3 
BIRD NO. 4 
BIRD NO. 5 
BIRD NO. 6 
BIRD NO. 7 
BIRD NO. 8 
BIRD NO. 9 
BIRD NO. 10 
BIRD NO. 11 
BIRD NO. 12 
BIRD NO. 13 
BIRD NO. 14 
BIRD NO. 15 
BIRD NO. 16 
BIRD NO. 17 
BIRD NO. 18 
HOLLAND 
PLACER GULCH 
GOLD CITY 
JAMES G. BLAINE 
MORTON 
SURPRISE 
LOOKOUT 
OUTZEN 
MINERAL SURVEY NO. 
4442 (continued) 
4455 
3334 
3851 
4301 
SNOW GIRL 
M. J. & S. 
MOGUL 
HAZEL KIRK 
4291 
ANNIE LAURIE 
SENATOR STEWART 
3207 
EXHIBIT A, Page 4 
CLAIM NAME MINERAL SURVEY NO. 
LILLIAN 3207 (continued) 
CHIEF DEVORA 
ROYAL GORGE 
NATIONAL 
H. S. & S. 
OVERLAND 
MINNIE MAUD 
OVERLAND FRACTION 4586 
ANNIE MINE 5297 
GENEVA 
FENNY 
SWITZERLAND 
COLUMBIA 5170 
YUKON 
U. S. TREASURY 
BRITANNIA 
KLONDIKE 
BANK OF ENGLAND 
Other Property 
(Piute County) 
Township 26 South. Range 5 West. SLB&M 
Section 36: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, NW1/4SW1/4, SV2W/2 
(Sevier County) 
Township 26 South. Range 5 West. SLB&M 
Section 36: W/2W/2 
2003184 
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Certificate of Service 
I, Valeen H. Brown Piute County Clerk certify that a true and correct copy of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Decree was mailed, postage prepaid, 
on this 7th day of November, 2003 to the following: 
Ronald G. Russell 
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee and Loveless 
P O Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84747-0019 
Warren H Peterson 
362 West Main Street 
Delta Utah 84624 
Richard G. Allen 
2975 West Executive Parkway Suite 200 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Signed this / day of November 2003. 
l/^vi-. i 
Valeen H. Brown, Piute County Clerk 
